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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-3418 
___________ 
 
DIMITRIOS MITCH FATOUROS, 
     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
EMMANUEL LAMBRAKIS; ARTEMIOS SORRAS; 
JOHN DOE NUMBERS 1 THROUGH 10 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:13-cv-04639) 
District Judge:  Honorable Claire C. Cecchi 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 18, 2015 
Before:  CHAGARES, JORDAN and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 23, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Dimitrios “Mitch” Fatouros filed a pro se complaint against Emmanuel 
Lambrakis, Artemios Sorras, and ten John Doe defendants, asserting claims of libel, 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
slander, and defamation.  More specifically, he alleged that when he contacted Lambrakis 
to discuss something that Lambrakis had said on a radio show, Lambrakis asked him, 
“Do you love Greece?”.  He also alleged that Lambrakis refused to be interviewed by 
him, and that Lambrakis stated, during an October 2012 newscast in Greece that was 
broadcast all over the world over the Internet, “I wish to say that Mr. Fatouros is financed 
and controlled.”  Fatouros also alleged that Lambrakis forwarded to someone in 
Maryland an e-mail in which he stated that he “was attacked . . . from Gialtouridis, 
Zoupaniotis, Fatouros, Stephanopolous . . . and not only.”  He maintained that the e-mail 
“was released on the [I]nternet.”     
 Fatouros also claimed that Sorras, while appearing on a radio program broadcast 
from New York, asked, “Or Fatouros.  If I meet him . . . does he know me?,” thus 
threatening him on “an FCC regulated frequency.”  He also alleged that a lawyer for 
Lambrakis and Sorras sent him “an outrageous threat,” to wit, a letter to cease-and-desist 
defamation of Lambrakis and Sorras.  Additionally, he maintained that a “spokesperson” 
for the two defendants asked him (after he called in to a Greek television show on which 
the “spokesperson” was appearing), “Would you like to tell us to which lobby you 
belong?,” and implied that he “was conspiring with a Greek-Jewish professor at St. 
John’s University.”  Fatouros further alleged that an associate of the two defendants also 
called the program to ask who was financing Fatouros’s attack and that “Lambrakis and 
his gang” post messages (in unspecified forums) calling him a traitor.       
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 Lambrakis and Sorras1 each filed a motion to dismiss Fatouros’s complaint on 
various grounds, including for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Fatouros did not file a true response to the motions, 
although he submitted a mandamus petition in our Court with a request that we order the 
District Court to terminate Sorras’s motion (C.A. No. 13-4792),2 and filed other 
documents in the District Court, including one titled “motion for stay pending plaintiff’s 
petition for a rehearing for a writ of mandamus & enlarge time to file a cross-motion for 
jurisdictional discovery” (ECF 26).3  Within the “motion for stay . . .,” he noted our 
statements, in denying his mandamus petition, that he had other adequate means to 
challenge the motion to dismiss and that he could raise his arguments in response to the 
motion to dismiss.  Fatouros then stated, in his “motion to stay . . .,” “[p]robably, this can 
be done through Jurisdictional Discovery:  is John Sispas Esq. representing Defendant 
Artemios Sorras in litigation, yes or no.  Sipsas said he did.  Defendant Sorras said Sipsa 
does not.  The U.S. Court of Appeals says Plaintiff has to exhaust his tools.  
Conclusively, Plaintiff is entitled to jurisdictional discovery.”   
                                              
1 Sorras filed his motion despite (like the Doe defendants) never having been served.   
 
2 Within his mandamus petition, he discussed, inter alia, whether John P. Sipsas, Esq., 
could receive service of the complaint for Sorras.  
 
3 The District Court docket reflects that “per [Fatouros] this is a reply.”   
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 Ultimately, the District Court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack 
of personal jurisdiction, dismissing the complaint without prejudice and permitting 
Fatouros to file an amended complaint within 30 days.  Fatouros appeals.   
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.4  We review de novo the District 
Court’s ruling that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants.  Eurofins Pharma 
US Holdings v. BioAlliance Pharma SA, 623 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 2010).  Fatouros had 
the burden of demonstrating facts that established personal jurisdiction.  Metcalfe v. 
Renaissance Marine, Inc., 566 F.3d 324, 330 (3d Cir. 2009).  Because we are reviewing 
an order granting Rule 12(b)(2) motions, and because the District Court did not hold an 
evidentiary hearing, Fatouros “needed only [to] establish a prima facie case of personal 
jurisdiction.”  D’Jamoos v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., 566 F.3d 94, 102 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation 
omitted).  In determining whether Fatouros had made out his prima facie case, the 
                                              
4 The District Court’s dismissal was “without prejudice.”  “Generally, an order which 
dismisses a complaint without prejudice is neither final nor appealable because the 
deficiency may be corrected by the plaintiff without affecting the cause of action.”  
Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam).  “Only if the 
plaintiff cannot amend or declares his intention to stand on his complaint does the order 
become final and appealable.”  Id. at 951–52.  In this case, Fatouros chose not to amend 
his complaint; he instead appealed and has declared his intention to stand on his 
complaint.  See Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 192 (3d Cir. 2007) (determining 
that a plaintiff had elected to stand on her complaint where she did not seek to correct the 
purported pleading deficiencies, but instead repeatedly asserted that her complaint was 
sufficient as filed).  We decline Fatouros’s request that we overrule Borelli.  We also 
reject Fatouros’s other arguments regarding our jurisdiction, including his assertion that 
we do not have jurisdiction because Sorras is not participating in this appeal.  Also, we 
note that the District Court’s order is final even though it does not address claims against 
the Doe defendants who were never served.  See United States v. Studivant, 529 F.2d 
673, 674 n.2 (3d Cir. 1976).            
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District Court was required to accept the allegations in the complaint as true and to 
construe any disputed facts in Fatouros’s favor.  Metcalfe, 566 F.3d at 330. 
 Fatouros alleged that Lambrakis is a citizen of the State of New York and Sorras is 
a citizen of “Canada and/or Greece.”  Fatouros, who is a resident of New Jersey, filed his 
complaint in a district court in that state.  The federal district courts in New Jersey may 
assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident only to the extent authorized by state law.  
Eurofins, 623 F.3d at 155.  We have recognized that “New Jersey’s long-arm statute 
provides for jurisdiction coextensive with the due process requirements of the United 
States Constitution.”  Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 96 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(citation omitted).  A defendant may be subject to the jurisdiction of a court only if “the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.”  J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787 (2011) (citation and 
internal quotations omitted).   
 Fatouros did not assert any jurisdictional facts that would support general personal 
jurisdiction.5  Kehm Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 537 F.3d 290, 300 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(explaining that a court has general personal jurisdiction over a defendant who has 
maintained systematic and continuous contacts with forum state).  Also, there was no 
                                              
5 While we base our decision on an evaluation of the whole District Court record in this 
case, we note that Fatouros’s response to the jurisdictional challenge borders on 
inadequate.  See Time Share Vacation Club v. Atl. Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 66 (3d Cir. 
1984) (holding that a plaintiff establishing personal jurisdiction must present more than 
“mere affidavits which parrot and do no more than restate plaintiff’s allegations without 
identification of particular defendants and without factual content”). 
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basis for specific personal jurisdiction over the defendants.  Specific personal jurisdiction 
exists “when the claim arises from or relates to conduct purposely directed at the forum 
state.”  Kehm Oil Co., 537 F.3d at 300; see also Asahi Metal Indus., Ltd. v. Superior 
Court of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987) (repeating that “minimum contacts 
must have a basis in some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the 
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and 
protections of its laws”) (internal quotations and citation omitted).   
 None of Lambrakis’s or Sorras’s alleged acts were directed into the forum state.6  
A radio broadcast in another state and a television broadcast in another country, both of 
which could be accessed over the Internet, and postings in Internet forums that could be 
read by individuals in New Jersey are insufficient bases for personal jurisdiction in this 
                                              
6 Fatouros may also wish to attribute to the defendants Sipsas’s act of sending a cease-
and-desist letter to him in New Jersey.  Assuming that an agency relationship existed 
between Sipsas and the defendants, and assuming that New Jersey allows personal 
jurisdiction over a person who acts through an agent, the acts of writing and sending the 
letter did not constitute the specific torts for which Fatouros sought relief, so they were 
not bases for specific jurisdiction.  Cf. IMO Indus. v. Kierkert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 261 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (explaining when specific jurisdiction may lie for an intentional tort).  
Fatouros did not describe the publication of the letter or the communication of the letter’s 
contents to anyone other than Fatouros himself.  Accordingly, the allegations did not 
describe defamation, slander, or libel, all of which have a communication or publication 
element.  See Gnapinsky v. Goldyn, 128 A.2d 697, 702 (N.J. 1957) (“Since the law of 
defamation seeks to secure reputation, there must be a communication to a third person. 
Without this essential element, neither libel nor slander is shown.”); see also G.D. v. 
Kenny, 15 A.3d 300, 310 (N.J. 2011) (describing the elements of a defamation action).  
Alternatively, even if the allegations were enough for the District Court to assert personal 
jurisdiction over the defendants only on a claim based on the cease-and-desist letter, 
Fatouros failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.     
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case.  Fatouros did not present a prima facie case that the defendants purposefully availed 
themselves of conducting activity in New Jersey “by directly targeting [their activities or 
postings] to the state, knowingly interacting with residents of [New Jersey] via [their 
activities or postings], or through sufficient other related contacts.”  Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. 
Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 454 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 
F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir. 2011) (noting that “posting allegedly defamatory comments or 
information on an internet site does not, without more, subject the poster to personal 
jurisdiction wherever the posting could be read”).   
 On appeal, Fatouros presses the argument that the District Court erred in 
dismissing his complaint without allowing him time for jurisdictional discovery.  We 
review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to deny a request for 
jurisdictional discovery.  Toys “R” Us, Inc., 318 F.3d at 455.  Even if Fatouros’s 
assertions relating to jurisdictional discovery in his “motion to stay . . .” could somehow 
be construed as a general request for jurisdictional discovery (or a request related to his 
claim about the letter sent by Sipsas), we conclude that the District Court did not abuse 
its discretion in declining to allow it.  Fatouros did not present factual allegations that 
suggested with reasonable particularity the possible existence of the requisite minimum 
contacts.  See Toys “R” Us, 318 F.3d at 456; see also Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover v. 
ABA, 107 F.3d 1026, 1042 (3d Cir. 1997) (explaining that jurisdictional discovery 
generally resolves the question whether a corporate defendant is doing business in the 
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state and that the presumption in favor of discovery is reduced when the defendant is an 
individual).     
 For these reasons, and because we conclude that Fatouros’s arguments are 
otherwise without merit,7 we will affirm the District Court’s ruling.  
 
 
                                              
7 In particular, we reject as baseless his claim that the District Judge was biased against 
him.  See, e.g., Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (“We have repeatedly stated that a party’s displeasure with legal rulings does 
not form an adequate basis for recusal.”).   
